BLOEMFONTEIN CONFERENCE: A DETERMINED PATH TO WAR

The ZAR franchise issue was the central issue between Britain and the northern Boer Republic but it was not the real reason for the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) which was political power.

The failure of the Bloemfontein Conference in the middle of 1899 (31 May-5 June) meant the path to war was a very short one.

British High Commissioner, Alfred Milner, was the ill-suited representative who ensured peace had no chance. Certainly he radiated sartorial elegance next to the crumpled figure of the aging ZAR (Transvaal) president, Paul Kruger. Yet clothes do not make the man and it was Oom Paul who approached the conference in a more conciliatory fashion than his tormentor. Kruger genuinely wanted peace but not any price; Milner sought confrontation and got his war.

I cannot imagine someone like Sir George Grey, a mid century Cape Governor, even remotely allowing this conference to drift to war like this later successor.

Unfortunately, for the Boers, they had a troika of arch-imperialists (Salisbury, Chamberlain and Milner) determined to ‘put them in their place.’ In some respects I agree with historians like GH Le May and JS Marais who believe it was Milner who was the chief culprit for the war. After all, Milner’s comment, to the interpreter Abraham Fischer, that “no matter what Kruger concedes I won’t be satisfied, I will ask for more,” was hardly conducive to finding a settlement.

However, it could also be argued he was merely the stalking horse for his political masters.

Clearly, regional power was the reason for the British intransigence, at the Conference, because it is hard to believe the franchise was such an insurmountable problem. Originally a 14 year qualification was required for Uitlanders to vote in ZAR elections (outsiders who had rushed into the Transvaal for the mining boom).

 Kruger’s acquiescence to reduce this to seven years, before the Bloemfontein Conference, was hardly the sign of a reluctant negotiator. As Chamberlain wanted a five year qualification rule, straight away, a ready compromise was clearly discernible, to the reasonable person, of six years.

Even after the abrupt end of their meeting in the Orange Free State, Kruger then agreed to the five year proviso, (August, 1899) but with some conditions added that deserved more than contemptuous dismissal. These included a request not to interfere any further in Transvaal affairs, arbitration of unresolved disputes and Britain relinquishing suzerainty over the ZAR.

At any time Colonial Secretary Chamberlain or PM Salisbury could have ordered Milner back to the negotiating table if there had been a real will to do so.

Instead, Milner’s behaviour throughout was the antithesis of diplomacy and he continued the politicking of Rhodes who had been disgraced by the Jameson Raid. Chamberlain’s career also should have ended over that fiasco, in which he had assisted Rhodes, the Cape PM, to obtain a departure point in Bechuanaland from which the attempted coup against the ZAR would take place.

Instead of learning a lesson, Chamberlain was, to preside over more destabilising tactics and allowed Milner to whip up the mob over the Edgar incident, encourage a second petition on grievances and then send out his infamous, Helot Telegram (May 1899). What a contrast to Sir William Butler who was acting High Commissioner when the Edgar incident occurred (Milner was on leave in London). Butler wisely realised a handful of Uitlander trouble makers were responsible for the sound and fury show and advised they be ignored.

However, Milner did not want ‘a period of peace and calm,’ as argued for by Butler, so it has to be asked whether he was the puppet master or the puppet?

Also Salisbury told Lord Rothschild, in September 1899, that he disapproved of any more contact with Kruger’s Government after a cabinet minister, the Duke of Devonshire, had contacted the ZAR, through Rothschild’s bank. The British PM also ignored an approach by the Transvaal’s representative, in London, to his private secretary.

Chamberlain, meanwhile, was saying that while a war would be ‘deplorable’ it would ‘put things on a sound basis for the future.’ Well, how did that turn out?

Kruger may have been unwise not to heed Devonshire’s ‘nod and wink to him’ that the British Government would not make any more demands if he didn’t make an issue of challenging Britain’s supreme power (suzerainty).

However, by then, Kruger probably thought the game was not worth the candle. Whether on internal or external policies Britain was showing a penchant to keep moving the goalposts; that the London Convention of 1884 really meant nothing;  and that Britain would interfere whenever it suited them. Trust had already been lost with the earlier annexation of the OFS diamond fields, as an example of Britain annexing territory, after freely giving it to that smaller republic in 1854.

The Anglo-Boer conflict is a clear example of an unnecessary war provoked by aggressive diplomacy to ensure British power remained paramount in the region.

The Bloemfontein Conference, and the aftermath, was a tragedy writ large.